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INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL AND DOUBLE 
RECOVERY 
CLAUDIO BOZZI∗ 
A combination of the economic significance of international tourism, the 
increased mobility of individuals, and their greater willingness and desire 
to manage their own movements has significant implications for insurers 
which currently remain under-appreciated. International visitors to 
Australia are more likely to die or suffer injury as the result of a motor 
vehicle accident than in any other way. While attention has been focused on 
the complex jurisdictional issues that may arise, other equally important 
problems such as the potential for action in double recovery have gone 
largely unnoticed. The need is particularly acute because, as many studies 
attest, the prospect of death and injury in motor vehicle accidents involving 
foreign licensees is only likely to increase. Injured third parties returning to 
home jurisdictions with national health systems will rightly draw on the 
resources of the state, public welfare, and sometimes private insurance to 
meet their health care needs. To complicate matters further, European 
countries typically view the state as a guarantor of individual and collective 
social rights, and, to varying extents, constitutionally guarantee health care 
and other relevant benefits such as unemployment payments. In effect, an 
injured third party receiving a payout for the cost of those injuries from an 
Australian insurer returns home as a citizen or resident of a state in which 
she or he draws on publicly funded health care and benefits. In Italy, for 
example, the needs of the injured third party are met by a devolved health 
care system which places the greatest burden of responsibility for the 
delivery and funding of services on regionally governed public enterprises, 
and to a lesser extent on other entities. Some of those providers have 
mounted actions in recovery for money spent and goods supplied for the 
treatment of the same injuries that are the subject of the insurance. The aim 
of this article is to address the theoretical basis and practical implications 
of actions taken against the insured injured party in the context of foreign 
constitutional and personal injuries law (or constitutionalised personal 
injuries law).  
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I INTRODUCTION: DYING TO GET THERE — ROAD 
TRAUMA AND INTERNATIONAL TRAVELLERS IN 
AUSTRALIA 
One of the hidden and bitter costs of a vibrant tourism industry is that foreign 
nationals, as they seek to explore a vast country like Australia by road, are 
frequently injured or die while driving or riding in a car. Despite the relative 
paucity of analysis of the problem of tourists and road safety,1 the available 
information supports the conclusion that motor vehicle accidents are the 
leading cause of accidental deaths and injuries for tourists worldwide,2 
including in Australia.3  
International licence holders are more likely than domestic licence holders to 
be involved in serious accidents. Although only 0.7 per cent of all fatal road 
accidents in Australia involve international licensees, 49 per cent of those 
involve vehicle operator fatalities (compared with 44 per cent for the whole 
population), and 20 per cent involve hospitalisation (compared with 11 per 
cent for the whole population).4 International driver and passenger fatalities 
and injuries can be attributed to unfamiliarity with driving requirements and 
                                                 
1 J Wilks, B Watson and I J Faulks, ‘International Tourists and Road Safety in Australia: 
Developing a National Research and Management Programme’ (1999) 20(5) Tourism 
Management 645, 646. Despite the dearth of available material, Australia is, by consensus 
among tourism health and medicine scholars, the best researched. See S J Page et al, ‘Scoping 
the Extent of Tourist Road Safety: Motor Vehicle Transport Accidents in New Zealand, 
1982–1996’ (2001) (4)6 Current Issues in Tourism 503. 
2 See J Wilks and D Pendergast, ‘International Tourists and Road Safety’ in B Prideaux and 
D Carson (eds), Drive Tourism Trends and Emerging Markets (Oxfordshire, 2011) 278, 278. 
For an early study, see S J Page and D Meyer, ‘Tourist Accidents: An Exploratory Analysis’ 
(1996) 23(3) Annals of Tourism Research 666; P A Leggatt and J Wilks, ‘Overseas Visitor 
Deaths in Australia, 2001 to 2003’ (2009) 16(4) Journal of Travel Medicine 243. 
3 J Wilks and M Coory, ‘Overseas Visitor Injuries in Queensland Hospitals 1996–2000’ (2002) 
13(1) Journal of Tourism Studies 2, 4; J Wilks, D Pendergast and M Wood, ‘Overseas Visitor 
Deaths in Australia: 1997–2000’ (2002) 5(6) Current Issues In Tourism 550 (finding that 10 
per cent of all inbound travellers’ deaths were due to land transport accidents); Wilks et al, 
above n 1. For an earlier study reflecting similar results in the United States, see J E Sniezek 
and S M Smith, ‘Injury Mortality among Non–US Residents in the United States 1979–1984’ 
(1991) 19(4) International Journal of Epidemiology 225. A study conducted to assess 
mortality amongst Canadians travelling abroad concluded similarly: see D W McPherson et 
al, ‘Death and Dying Abroad: The Canadian Experience’ (2000) 7(5) Journal of Travel 
Medicine 227. Similarly, see C Guse et al, ‘Fatal Injuries of US Citizens Abroad’ (2007) 
14(5) International Journal of Travel Medicine 279. 
4 The study was conducted for the years 1996–99: B Watson, D Tunnicliff, J Manderson and 
E O’Connor, The Safety of International Visitors on Australian Roads (Carrs-Q, Caseldine, 
2004). Watson et al noted that this figure did not include all road- and driver-related injuries 
and fatalities such as those involving passengers and pedestrians because data focused solely 
on drivers of motor vehicles and riders of motor cycles. 
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conditions in a foreign country.5 For example, in the Northern Territory, 
where 13 per cent of fatalities and 8 per cent of all injuries involved 
international drivers, 64 per cent were drivers from right hand side drive 
jurisdictions.6 Because rental vehicles are far more likely to be involved in 
accidents than driver-owned vehicles,7 insurers face far greater costs for the 
registration of rental vehicles than do owner motorists.8 Further research 
shows that motor vehicle accident-related hospital admissions of tourists for 
the three years between 2002 and 2005 totalled 6578, amounting to 23 252 
days of bed occupancy 
Tourism-related motor vehicle accidents involving foreign road users 
therefore represent a significant economic cost.9 Absolute figures, however, 
make injury to foreign road users a low priority for road safety authorities, 
and the tourism sector’s sensitivity to adverse publicity explains its 
conspicuous reluctance to address the problem.10 While Australia is a popular 
tourist destination, the tourism industry is not legally compelled to warn 
drivers about the hazards of the road,11 and adjacent industries such as car 
rental companies largely ignore the need for the education of foreign nationals 
renting motor vehicles, adopting the attitude that driving involves ‘obvious 
risks’.12 A number of factors suggest that this lack of driver education will 
                                                 
5 Wilks and Pendergast, above n 2, 293. 
6 Watson et al, above n 4; J Wilks et al, ‘International Drivers in Unfamiliar Surroundings: The 
Problems of Disorientation’ (1999) 17(6) Travel Medicine International 162. For an 
alternative recent explanation with respect to tourism in Spain, see Jaume Rossello and Oscar 
Saenz-de-Miera, ‘Road Accidents and Tourism: The Case of the Balearic Islands (Spain)’ 
(2011) 43(3) Accident Analysis and Prevention 675 (meteorological conditions are 
determinative). 
7 Page and Meyer, above n 2. 
8 D Matcham, ‘An Insurance Perspective’ in J Wilks, B Watson and R Hansen (eds), 
International Visitors and Road Safety in Australia: A Status Report (Australian Transport 
Safety Bureau, 1998). 
9 At 1997 prices it was calculated that 2482 international driver crashes cost AU$18 912 000 
consisting of: AU$4 272 000 for fatalities; AU$9 620 000 for hospitalisations; AU$1 980 000 
for medical treatment; AU$1 020 000 for minor injuries; AU$2 020 000 for property damage: 
Jeffrey Wilks and Barry C Watson, ‘Road Safety and International Visitors in Australia: 
Looking Beyond the Tip of the Iceberg’ (1998) 16(5) Travel Medicine International 194. See 
also T Bentley et al, ‘Recreational Tourism Injuries among Visitors to New Zealand: An 
Exploratory Analysis Using Hospital Discharge Data’ (2001) 22 Tourism Management 373. 
Equally significant and harder to calculate is the cost of the suffering endured by the injured, 
the ongoing management and treatment of their injuries, legal costs, the impact on industry 
and generally on the economy. 
10 Wilks et al, above n 1. 
11 Wilks and Pendergast, above n 2, 278. 
12 Ibid. For a model developed on risk averse tourism, see B Prideaux and H Master, ‘Reducing 
Risk Factors for International Visitors in Destinations’ (2001) 6(2) Pacific Journal of Tourism 
Research 24.  
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continue to be an important issue for the insurance industry. Without 
concerted efforts to adjust driver behaviour, and to educate foreign drivers 
about local conditions, the cost of international road trauma will be borne by 
the insurance industry.  
II INSURING INTERNATIONAL TRAVELLERS IN AUSTRALIA: 
COMPULSORY THIRD PARTY INSURANCE REGIMES AND 
THE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE FOREIGN TRAVELLER 
Compulsory third party (CTP) schemes that provide compensation to people 
injured in motor vehicle accidents are a feature of insurance law in virtually 
all developed nations. The underlying rationale of all such schemes, despite 
significant differences between them, is that — for the sake of fairness to 
injured persons, and for cost efficiency — the burden of paying for the 
negligence of a few drivers is shared by all drivers contributing to a pool of 
funds. The motor vehicle registration scheme operating in Australia, which 
requires all vehicles using Australian roads to be registered, operates on a 
state by state basis. The accompanying CTP insurance schemes provide 
compulsory state-based injury insurance for all registered vehicles.13 Under 
Australian laws which require insurance with all vehicle registrations, an at-
fault driver becomes the insured under a contract of insurance, and provides 
coverage for injuries sustained by third parties. The cost to the insurance 
industry of a third party fatality is fixed, but the cost of injuries to the third 
party is ongoing. These state-based CTP schemes, while disparately 
structured, are similarly motivated: they make funds available for the 
management of the health and recovery of persons injured in motor vehicle 
accidents due to the negligence of drivers.14  
Australia currently has a patchwork of common law fault-based insurance 
schemes, or no-fault and hybrid schemes. In Victoria, for example, a no-fault 
system of insurance restricts access to the common law by imposing whole 
                                                 
13 Refer Motor Accidents (Compensation) Act 1999 (NSW); Motor Accident Insurance Act 
1994 (Qld); Motor Vehicle Third Party Insurance) Act 1943 (WA); Wrongs (Liability and 
Damages for Personal Injury) Amendment Act 2002 (SA); Motor Accidents (Liabilities and 
Compensation) Act 1973 (Tas); Road Transport (General) Act (ACT); Motor Accident 
(Compensation) Act 1979 (NT). In the Australian Capital Territory (ACT), vehicles owned by 
the Commonwealth of Australia or the ACT are not required to be insured. The governments 
involved meet claims under their own arrangements in the same way as an insurer.  
14 Typical is s 5A of the Road Transport (Third-Party Insurance) Act 2008 (ACT). These 
objectives include promoting the rehabilitation of people injured in a motor accident, 
encouraging the speedy resolution of claims, keeping the costs of insurance at an affordable 
level, and promoting competition for CTP premiums in the ACT. 
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person impairment (WPI)15 thresholds, reducing the eligibility of the injured 
person to claim for pain and suffering. The loss of access to the common law 
is somewhat mitigated, however, by ‘narrative’ tests, allowing courts to take 
into account the subjective impact of injury on the particular claimant.16 
Tourists who are involved in accidents involving other vehicles and who 
suffer personal injuries in Australia are insured under CTP schemes, and suits 
against the insured are subrogated to the insurer. Typically, insurers meet the 
injured person’s medical expenses incurred within the first six months after 
the accident. Thereafter, upon admitting liability, the insurer assumes the 
obligation of meeting the further, reasonably incurred, medical expenses of 
the claimant, and of providing for, and making available, reasonable and 
appropriate rehabilitation services pending settlement of the claim.  
Frequently, however, the claimant–visitors return to home jurisdictions where 
they receive treatment and assistance for the injuries sustained in that accident 
and for the consequences of those injuries. This assistance is given by various 
regional and corporate facilities and service providers, sometimes on the basis 
of constitutionally guaranteed rights.17  
In those cases one of two situations may theoretically arise. The insurer in 
Australia, which has covered the third-party costs, may wish to seek recovery 
from the injured traveller of that portion of the costs that has been duplicated 
by the overseas authority. Conversely, the overseas authorities may wish to 
take action against the traveller for payments which have duplicated the 
payments of the Australian insurer. In other words, action for recovery of 
double payment may theoretically be instigated by either state or its agencies 
                                                 
15 See the Transport Accident Act 1986 (Vic) s 93(3) (‘TAA’) used in conjunction with the 
Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (American Medical Association, 4th ed, 
1993). For further interpretation, see Transport Accident Commission v Elworthy 
[2007] VSC 48 [22] followed in Transport Accident Commission v Serwylo [2010] VSC 421 
upholding the Tribunal’s decision in Serwylo v Transport Accident Commission [2010] 
VCAT 181. 
16 See the TAA s 93(17) requiring that the injuries be ‘at least “very considerable” and certainly 
more than “significant” or “marked”’. For clarification refer to Haden Engineering Pty Ltd v 
McKinnon (2010) 31 VR 1; Sutton v Laminex Group Pty Ltd (2011) 31 VR 100. WPI 
thresholds also operate in New South Wales (see Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 
(NSW)) and have been criticised as unfair, and as merely a cost saving measure: see Law 
Council of Australia, South Australia’s Compulsory Third Party Insurance Scheme — 2012 
Green Paper (Law Council of Australia, 2012). The law applying to CTP claims in the ACT 
is the Road Transport (Third-Party Insurance) Act 2008 (ACT) and the Road Transport 
(Third-Party Insurance) Regulation 2008 (ACT). CTP claims are also subject to the Civil Law 
(Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) and the Limitation Act 1985 (ACT). South Australia has no-fault 
cover with no access to common law compensation. The Queensland motor accident scheme 
allows unrestricted access to common law compensation within a tight procedural framework. 
17 Examples of European Constitutions with ‘right to health’ provisions include those of Italy, 
Poland and Hungary. 
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for expenses incurred in treating and managing the care of the patient. The 
success of such actions would, however, depend on the provisions of the local 
law. 
A The Prospect of a Double Recovery Action Taken 
against the Traveller under Victorian Law 
A double recovery provision has been introduced into the Victorian TAA.18 
Section 42(1)(a) of the TAA entitles the Transport Accident Commission 
(‘TAC’) to recover payments made to an injured person, or a deceased’s 
dependant, following a claim for compensation, or a suit that sounds in 
damages. The provision is, however, limited to seeking the repayment of 
money paid to the injured person, or their dependent or surviving spouse, only 
where the person has received, been awarded, or accepted, the payment of 
compensation, or a sum in damages ‘under the law of a place outside 
Victoria’. 
Section 42(2) disentitles injured persons, or the deceased’s dependants or 
surviving partners, to compensation under the Act where eligible persons, 
under the laws of ‘a place outside Victoria’ have recovered ‘(a) an amount of 
compensation or damages’, or when ‘(b) an award of compensation or 
judgment for damages has been made’, or a ‘(c) payment into court has been 
accepted’, or ‘(d) a compromise or settlement of a claim’ has been reached, or 
‘(e) a claim for compensation … has been accepted’, or ‘(f) an action for 
damages’ has commenced.  
Where the relevant person has been compensated under the TAA, the 
Commission may recover as a ‘debt’ the amount it has paid that person if the 
person has received ‘compensation or damages’, or ‘an award of 
compensation or judgment for damages’, or has accepted payment into 
court.19 
The question of whether the reference in section 42 to ‘place’ was a reference 
to geographical location on the one hand, or a jurisdiction on the other, was 
considered in McClurg v Transport Accident Commission (General).20 In that 
case, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal was asked to consider 
whether the applicant — who had been granted compensation under the TAA 
for injuries suffered in a motor vehicle accident — could also claim damages 
under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (‘TPA’) against the manufacturer of 
                                                 
18 The section appears not to have equivalents in the related acts. 
19 TAA ss 42(3)(b)(i)–(iv). 
20 [2010] VCAT 482. 
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the motor vehicle. The primary question for determination was whether the 
TPA, being an Act of the Commonwealth, was a law of a place outside 
Victoria. The issue was resolved in favour of giving the word ‘place’ the 
meaning of ‘geographical area or location’ (as submitted by the applicant), as 
opposed to the ‘metaphorical concept of a legal jurisdiction which may 
overlap Victorian territory’.21 The Tribunal based its reasoning on the 
principles of statutory construction which promote locating the meaning of a 
statute in ‘the text of the Statute itself’;22 and, further, was persuaded by the 
omission of the TPA from section 37 of the TAA which lists those 
Commonwealth Acts that specifically disentitle injured persons’, or deceased 
persons’ dependants or spouses, to claim compensation. 
A further question, that was neither relevant to, nor raised in, the proceedings, 
is whether ‘place’, given its geographical definition, includes a place outside 
Australia. By virtue of section 37, the Commission is not liable to ‘pay 
compensation in respect of a person who is injured or dies’ where the person 
is ‘entitled to compensation in respect of their injury or death under’ certain 
Commonwealth Acts, or Commonwealth, state or territory laws equivalent to 
the TAA. Similarly, section 39(1)(a) relieves the Commission of liability in 
Victoria, and other states or territories. Under section 35, compensation is 
available where the accident occurred in Victoria, or another state or territory. 
Nothing in the Act appears to indicate that the legislators had foreign or 
international ‘places’ in contemplation. By reference to the text of section 42 
and the related sections23 of Division 3 of the TAA, ‘place’ must be read 
restrictively to refer to Australian states and territories only. 
In short, the double recovery provisions of the TAA are limited to, and 
designed to prevent, double payments of sums of money. This is reinforced by 
section 42, which gives the Commission the right to recover a ‘debt’, and is 
further strengthened by the section’s silence on the provision of goods and 
services, such as medications and treatments (whether under the law of an 
Australian state or territory, or a foreign place). Further, neither section 42 
specifically, nor the TAA in general, is aimed at the institution of actions in 
places outside Australia, and the awards and compensation that may be 
available or obtained there. 
In other words, the TAC could not expect to be able to take successful action 
for double recovery against, for example, an Italian traveller after the traveller 
had returned home and where the injuries covered by the TAC payment had 
been treated in Italy at Italian expense.  
                                                 
21 Ibid [25]. 
22 Ibid [24]. 
23 TAA ss 35, 37, 39. 
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B The Prospect of a Double Recovery Action Taken 
against the Traveller under Italian Law 
In the hypothetical scenario above, an injured third-party passenger in a motor 
vehicle accident where that vehicle is leased in an Australian jurisdiction 
under Australian law returns to her home jurisdiction (in this case, Italy) to 
receive treatment and other health care services and unemployment benefits. 
Under such circumstances, can the Italian traveller who has the advantage of 
compulsory third party insurance in Australia be liable to the home state for 
services rendered by that home state over and above the insurance payment 
made by the Australian insurer under a policy enforceable in Australia? Can 
the Italian authorities recover from the traveller moneys that he or she has 
received from the TAC which were intended to cover the costs of care and 
rehabilitation of the kind the traveller receives in Italy? This article deals with 
the issues that arise in pursuing such a course of action. 
The questions of law arising in the circumstances include: 
• What are the rights (if any) of the Italian regional and corporate 
facilities and service providers to recover amounts paid to the plaintiff 
either by way of judgment or settlement?  
• Could any Italian payments by way of unemployment or disability 
pensions be recovered? 
The Italian example is provided because not only are Italians frequent visitors 
to and drivers in Australia, but also because Italian law is particularly 
informative and instructive in that: 
(1) the Italian Constitution24 enshrines a right to health care and other 
benefits not only for its citizens but for all people in Italy;  
(2) the Italian Constitution is backed by the jurisprudence of a strong 
Constitutional Court; and 
(3) the Italian Civil Code25 is an exemplar of, and the Italian jurisdiction 
an instructive proxy for, other code and civil law jurisdictions.  
                                                 
24 Constitution of the Republic of Italy dated 22 December 1947, entered into force 1 January 
1948 (‘Italian Constitution’). 
25 The project of an Italian civil code began in the early 19th century, and was first realised with 
the creation of the Kingdom of Italy by Napoleon, and the adoption of the French Civil Code 
for Italian purposes. The Terzo statuto costituzionale 5 giugno 1805 [Third Constitutional 
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III THE SOURCES OF COMPENSATION UNDER 
ITALIAN LAW 
To understand the cause of action in double recovery against the traveller it is 
essential to appreciate that the provision of health care in Italy is 
constitutionally guaranteed, as is the traveller’s entitlement to unemployment 
benefits. Health care payments are considered first because, as guaranteed 
under the Constitution, they are directly and not provisionally available. 
While subject to fiscal conditions, health care is nevertheless universally 
accessible. Access to unemployment benefits, on the other hand, is dependent 
upon entitlement, and therefore subject to provisions made for it by the 
legislature.  
A The Italian Health System 
1 The Development of Social Rights for Citizens and 
Eligible Residents in Italy 
Italy is a civil law jurisdiction and a Code jurisdiction and as such is 
distinguished from common law jurisdictions. Its law is influenced by the 
major 19th century civil codes,26 which in turn were influenced by the first 
three books of the Institutes of Justinian (of persons, of things and of 
obligations).27 
The 19th century Italian Code was premised on the recognition of persons as 
owners of private property, of rights as individually held, and of negotiations 
as free from interference by the state. The 1942 Civil Code and 1948 
Constitution, however, reformulated the relationship between civil life and 
commercial activity through a simultaneous ‘socialisation’ and 
                                                                                                                    
Statute of 5 June 1805] art 55 declared that: ‘Non vi sarà che un solo Codice Civile per tutto il 
regno d’Italia’ [There will be in force, in Italy, only one civil code]. Its goal therefore was the 
unification of the laws pertaining to civil matters in the unified peninsula, and the replacement 
of those codes and statutes which had governed diverse geographical areas prior to its 
introduction. Nevertheless, when the Kingdom of Italy was established under a national 
parliament in 1861, numerous civil codes were still operative, and another unifying Civil 
Code was issued in 1865. The modern Italian Civil Code — Codice Civile [Civil Code] (Italy) 
— emerged in 1942, during the fascist era. The debate about whether it carries a political 
legacy has been settled in the negative: see R Nicolò, ‘Codice Civile’ in Enciclopedia del 
Diritto (Guiffrè, 1960) 240, 246. It codifies all aspects of civil and commercial private law. 
26 The Code civil [Civil Code] (France), also known as ‘Code Napoléon’; Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch [Civil Code] (Germany); Codice Civile [Civil Code] (Italy). 
27 On the history and nature of the concept of civil law see R Nicolò, ‘Diritto Civile’ in 
Enciclopedia del Diritto (Guiffrè, 1964) 904. On the ill-fated attempt to establish a ‘Fascist 
legal order’ on the basis of the Italian Civil Code see Nicolò, ‘Codice Civile’, above n 25.  
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‘commercialisation’ of private law. This transformation was based on the 
increasingly significant role of the state in the lives of individuals. The state 
regulated private law (such as the protection of the weaker party in private 
bargains); it introduced the concept of the ‘enterprise’, defined as an 
organised commercial activity; it made extensive provision for the 
modernisation of relations between labour and capital; and it redesigned the 
economy, moving away from small scale agrarianism towards 
industrialisation and mass production.28  
The social rights embodied in the Code and the Constitution reflected the 
expanded role of government in economic development and labour reform. 
They also reflected a recast nationalism, offering new forms of citizenship. 
The right of all people legally in Italy to access to the same level of health 
care regardless of income, ability to pay, or place of residence is guaranteed 
by article 3 of the Italian Constitution.29 In 1978, the state sought to meet its 
obligations to its people by the establishment of a national health service (the 
Servizio Sanitario Nazionale, or ‘SSN’), with the aim of delivering a system 
of universal health care funded out of general taxation.30 
The historical and social transformation of Italy from a collection of atomised 
self-regulated units, to interrelated citizens in a project of nationhood, is 
essential to explaining the policy implications of the Constitution. In essence, 
statehood and state membership are components of a system of reciprocal 
recognition. The State’s legitimacy is the product of the political endorsement 
it receives by legislating for the welfare of its members. 
                                                 
28 The process of commercialisation of private law in Italy is closely related to the 
transformation of the Italian economy that followed unification. See T Ascarelli, Corso di 
Diritto Commerciale (Giuffrè, 3rd ed, 1962) 74–8. For the counter-tendency toward 
‘civilisation of the commercial law’ see M Bianca, ‘L’autonomina dell’interprete’ (1965) 1 
Rivista di Diritto Civile 478, 485–6.  
29 According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (‘OECD’), the 
World Health Organization (‘WHO’), and the European Union (‘EU’), all developed 
countries’ health systems are to be measured against the equitable provision of and access to 
health care: J Hurst, Performance Measurement and Performance Management in OECD 
Health Systems (OECD, 2001); WHO, The World Health Report 2000. Health Systems: 
Improving Performance (WHO, 2000); A Atkinson et al (eds), Social Indicators: The EU and 
Social Inclusion (Oxford University Press, 2002). 
30 The Italian system took its cue from the British National Health Service (‘NHS’). The NHS 
is financed from central tax revenues; purchasing decisions are made at the district level by 
government health authorities, secondary and tertiary care is provided by not for profit NHS 
Trusts, and primary care is delivered by private general practitioners who contract with the 
government. See Christopher Ham, Health Policy in Britain (MacMillan, 3rd ed, 1992).  
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2 Delivering Health Care to Italian Citizens and 
Residents: The SSN and the Claimant in the Recovery 
Action 
Italy has had a national health service since the 1978 introduction of the SSN. 
Health care and the operation of the SSN are governed primarily by Law No 
833 of 1978, which provides for a system of universal health care funded out 
of general taxation. It ensures comprehensive health insurance and 
standardised health care to all Italian citizens and, since 2002,31 to all legal 
residents. Under the Italian Constitution, responsibility for health care is 
shared by the state and the 20 regions. The SSN is a decentralised tri-level 
structure headed by a Ministry of Health, which allocates funds to 20 regional 
health authorities, which in turn disburse funds through 200 local health 
agencies (azienda sanitaria locale – ‘ASL’).32  
The purpose of the original devolution of responsibility to the regional 
government level was to ensure improved decision-making, to heighten 
accountability and to increase responsiveness to the needs of patients, in an 
effort to ensure the equitable provision of health care in line with the 
objectives of the welfare state. However, the SSN in fact broke down into 
enclaves of clientelism at the municipal level and the local management 
committees became power bases for local politicians who used social services 
as currency both in substantial transactions and in smaller everyday 
dealings.33 
In 1992 the Amato Government reformed the health care sector. The reforms 
were driven by the three factors: of endogenous budgetary constraints; 
exogenous constraints related to meeting Maastricht Treaty criteria for entry 
into the European Economic Zone;34 and a desire to introduce the new public 
management paradigms into public administration. In accordance with an 
                                                 
31 Legislative Decree no 286 of 1998 (Italy) art 35. 
32 Law no 883 of 1978 (Italy) arts 51, 53. 
33 See in particular M Ferrera, ‘The Partitocracy of Healthcare: Towards a New Welfare 
Politics in Italy’ (1996) 38 Res Publica 447. See also M Ferrera, ‘The Southern Model of 
Welfare in Social Europe’ (1996) 6 Journal of European Social Policy 17; M Ferrera, 
‘Welfare States and Social Safety Nets in Southern Europe: An Introduction’ in M Ferrera 
(ed), Welfare State Reform in Southern Europe (Routledge, 2005) 1; D Hine, ‘Federalism, 
Regionalism and the Unitary State: Contemporary Regional Pressures in Historical 
Perspective’ in Carl Levy (ed), Italian Regionalism: History, Identity and Politics (Berg, 
1996); F Maino, ‘The Restructuring of the Health Service: The Bindi Reform and Fiscal 
Federalism’ in M Caciagli and A Zuckerman (eds), Italian Politics: A Review (Berghahn, 
2001). 
34 M Rhodes and D Natali, ‘The Berlusconi Pension Reform and the European Double 
Cleavage in Distributive Politics’ in J Newell and C Guarnieri (eds), Politica in Italia (Il 
Mulino, 2005); M Monti, Il Governo Dell’economia e Della Moneta (Longanesi, 1992).  
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enterprise formula (aziendalizzazione), Law No 111 of 1991 aimed to bring 
legal and administrative structures into line with management practices.35 It 
provided for the position of aministratore straordinario (special manager) to 
challenge the collegial management practices in Italy by promoting the 
effective and efficient delivery of services over legal safeguards and 
constitutional formalism,36 and by depoliticising health care.37  
The original model whereby health care was organised as an extension from a 
local base (municipalisation) was reversed; ASLs were transformed into 
public enterprises, thereby becoming dependants of the region and 
independent of municipal administration. As public enterprises they are 
organised through 100 per cent state-owned holding companies, with 
controlling interests in diversified sub-holdings. These, in turn, own 
individual enterprises, occasionally with minority private shareholders. The 
sub-holdings are mostly incorporated as private joint-stock corporations, are 
governed by private commercial law, and follow a private accounting 
system.38 Public enterprises plan their own activities according to local 
demands, allocate their budgets without municipal participation, and establish 
strict accounting systems. The enterprise formula granted juridical autonomy 
to all local health care authorities and selected public hospitals, making their 
                                                 
35 For a discussion relating to post-war economic policy and the concept of the enterprise in the 
1942 Civil Code (Italy), see Ascarelli, above n 28, 133–5, 862–3, 914, 918–21. On the ‘public 
enterprise’ in Italy, see J C Adams and P Barile, The Government of Republican Italy 
(Houghton Mifflin, 1961) 190–6. For a history and description of the most widely discussed 
of these enterprises, the Ente nazionale idrocarburi (or ENI), see D Votaw, The Six-Legged 
Dog: Mattei and ENI, A Study of Power (University of California Press, 1964) 117.  
36 K König, ‘Entrepreneurial Management or Executive Administration: The Perspective of 
Classical Administration’ in W Kickert (ed), Public Management and Administrative Reform 
in Western Europe (Edward Elgar, 1997). On the influence of new public managerialism in 
Italy, see P Mattei, ‘The Administrative Framework of Intergovernmental Relations: Italian 
Regions and Communes after the Health Care Reforms of the 1990s’ (2004) 14(4) Regional 
and Federal Studies 538; C Hood, The Art of the State: Culture, Rhetoric, and Public 
Management (Oxford University Press, 1998).  
37 Minister for Health Francesco De Lorenzo said in an interview that the post was created so 
that local health authorities and public hospitals will be headed by a person ‘who is not 
involved in politics’: ‘Intervista al Ministro della Sanità’, La Stampa (Torino, 19 October 
1992) 11. See also Mattei, above n 36; J Pierre (ed), Bureaucracy in the Modern State: An 
Introduction to Comparative Public Administration (Edward Elgar, 1995); F Ferraresi, 
‘Burocrazia e Politica in Italia’ in M Ferrera and G Zincone (eds), La Salute Che Noi 
Pensiamo: Domanda Sanitaria e Politiche Pubbliche in Italia (Il Mulino, 1986).  
38 See A Kumar, State Holding Companies and Public Enterprises in Transition (St Martin’s 
Press, 1993) for a survey on the evolution and organisation of Italian state holding companies. 
The importance of the economic role that public enterprises play in Italy is reflected in the 
fact that they account for approximately 15 per cent of the non-agricultural labour force, 20 
per cent of value added, and 25 per cent of fixed investments. The public sector also controls 
approximately 70 per cent of banking assets as well as playing a leading role in the provision 
of services and utilities.  
2013 INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL AND DOUBLE RECOVERY 39 
acts subject to principles of legality. Citizens now became clients of the 
administration not only in a political sense, but also in a strict legal sense.  
The forensic and procedural significance of understanding the structure of 
health care delivery is that it identifies the legal entity likely to launch actions 
against the injured traveller (an Italian citizen or eligible resident) who has 
received payment under a compulsory third party insurance scheme overseas. 
Following the 1992 Amato reforms, ASLs have assumed separate legal status 
as public enterprises with the requisite capacity for prosecuting and defending 
legal suits and would therefore be the parties to take action.  
3 How Justiciable and How Enforceable are Guarantees 
to Universal Health Care under the Italian Constitution? 
a Guaranteeing Health Care under the Italian Constitution 
Historically, the conception of the state as welfarist has led to European 
constitutions acknowledging state obligations of the kind discussed here.39 
The Italian welfare state developed during the 1970s and early 1980s, 
approaching levels of welfare provision on a par with most European states. 
There is some degree of clientelistic dependency on forms of social payment, 
making for a highly diversified — and usually regionally differentiated — 
relationship of the individual with the state. Nevertheless, the national health 
system, established in 1978, is an example of the state enshrining 
universalistic principles. Health is included amongst the interests protected by 
the law and is recognised by article 32 of the Constitution as an absolute right 
and, as such, fundamental, inalienable and indispensable. Article 32 provides: 
(1) The republic protects individual health as a basic right of the individual 
and in the interests of the community; it provides free medical care to the 
poor. 
(2) Nobody may be forcefully submitted to medical treatment except as 
regulated by law. That law may in no case violate the limits imposed by 
respect for the human being. 
                                                 
39 G Casper, ‘Changing Concepts of Constitutionalism: 18th to 20th Centuries’ (1989) The 
Supreme Court Review 311, 317–19. According to Casper, 18th and 19th century continental 
European constitutions and codes acknowledged state obligations to provide food, work and 
financial aid to persons in need. Early constitutions used the language of ‘obligation’ rather 
than ‘rights’. Thus, the continental concept of the ‘state’ is closer to the Anglo–American 
notion of the ‘welfare state’ or the ‘administrative state’: at 318–19. According to 
M A Glendon, ‘Rights in Twentieth-Century Constitutions’ (1992) 59 University of Chicago 
Law Review 519, 520–1, these are ‘second generation’ constitutions, compared with the first 
generation United States Constitution. 
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The right to health is often referred to as a ‘second generation’ human right, 
and is a feature of liberal Western European constitutions.40 It is frequently 
discussed as part of a larger formation of economic, social and cultural rights. 
Arguably, the right to health as mentioned in the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is programmatic in that that it is not 
self-executing, and requires implementation by legislative means, executive 
action, and the expenditure of public funds.41 Further, although state action is 
required to implement such a right, programmatic rights per se are often seen 
as only aspirational and as not creating judicially enforceable individual 
rights,42 nor as being justiciable against the state.43  
The view of the right to health as being aspirational is inapplicable in Italy, 
however. The Italian Constitution comprises 139 articles dealing first with 
‘fundamental principles’ (articles 1–12), and then divided into two main parts. 
Part I (which concerns us here and which consists of articles 13–54) deals 
with the ‘rights and duties of the citizen’ under four heads or titles: civil 
relations; ethical and social relations; economic relations; and political 
                                                 
40 The concept of the ‘generations’ of rights — the first being civil and political; the second, 
economic, social, and cultural; and the third consisting of collective rights, such as minority 
rights and indigenous peoples’ rights — has been widely used but no less widely criticised for 
concealing both different patterns of national development and the links between rights of 
different ‘generations’. See, eg, P Alston (ed), People’s Rights (Oxford University Press, 
2001) 1–2; E Asbjorn and A Rosas, ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Universal 
Challenge’ in E Asbjorn and C Krause (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A 
Textbook (Martinus Nijhoff, 2nd ed, 2001) 4–5. 
41 See, eg, M Scheinin, ‘Economic and Social Rights as Legal Rights’ in E Asbjorn and 
C Krause (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook (Martinus Nijhoff, 2nd ed, 
2001) 29; M Craven, ‘The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in 
R Burchill et al (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Their Implementation in United 
Kingdom Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 1999) 1. See Glendon, above n 39, 528. Although 
international trends indicate increased recognition of positive contents rights on the basis of 
fundamental human rights principles, human rights instruments and organisational definitions 
of ‘health,’ or a ‘right to health’ are not enforceable, so they have no ‘bite’. For a ‘violations’ 
approach see, eg, Virginia A Leary, ‘The Right to Complain: The Right to Health’ in 
F Coomans and F van Hoof (eds), The Right to Complain about Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: Proceedings of the Expert Meeting on the Adoption of an Optional Protocol 
to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights held from 25–28 
January 1995 in Utrecht (Utrecht, 1995) 87–106 (discussing the state obligation not to violate 
the right to health). 
42 See, eg, Asahi v Minister of Health and Welfare [1967] 21 MINSHO 1043 (Supreme Court 
of Japan) translated in H Tanaka (ed), The Japanese Legal System: Introductory Cases and 
Materials (University of Tokyo Press, 1976) 793, 795–6 (holding that the art 25 welfare rights 
are not judicially enforceable individual rights). 
43 A Hendriks, ‘The Right to Health in National and International Jurisprudence’ (1998) 5 
European Journal of Health Law 389, 401. 
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relations.44 The right to health (article 32) does not require supplementary 
legislation to ensure its full application. The right to health, at least in the first 
paragraph of the article, is expressed as the strongest form of individual right. 
By definition it is capable of being invoked in ordinary legal proceedings 
between individuals, as well as being the subject of claims between individual 
and state. By contrast, the rights in the second paragraph are expressed as 
being subject to specified controls (‘except as regulated by law’).  
The traveller who is injured and subsequently compensated, and who returns 
to Italy, receives medical and associated treatment as of right. The 
inalienability of that right, expressed in the strongest possible terms, may be 
invoked by the returned citizen in proceedings against that person, whether by 
private institutions or state authorities.  
To what extent the courts would limit the right so recognised, and what effect 
fiscal realities and policy settings would have on the fulfilment of the state’s 
obligations under the right, is the next matter for consideration.  
b The Jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court 
In practice, reliance on the right to health involves a reference to a specialised 
constitutional jurisdiction for the authoritative interpretation of the right. That 
jurisdiction, the Italian Constitutional Court, was created45 using provisions of 
the Constitution that deal not with the judiciary but with constitutional 
guarantees.46 The Court was seen as an essential recognition of the basic 
                                                 
44 Italian Constitution pt II arts 55–139 deals with the ‘Organisation of the Republic’ under six 
heads: Parliament; the President of the Republic; the Government; the Judiciary; the Regions, 
Provinces and Communes; and Constitutional Guarantees. The ‘transitional and final 
provisions’ are numbered separately (arts I–XVIII). 
45 The Constitutional Court was not established until eight years after the Constitution came 
into force. Only in March 1953 did the parliamentary situation allow the necessary enabling 
legislation to be passed. President Gronchi appointed five judges in December 1955, and on 
15 December 1955, all 15 judges took their oath of office. On 23 January 1956, the Court held 
an organisational meeting where Enrico De Nicola was elected the first President of the Court. 
On 23 April 1956, the Court began its official life when, following an inaugural address by 
President De Nicola, the first public hearing was held. The President’s inaugural speech is 
reproduced in P Curci, La Corte Costituzionale (Giuffrè, 1956) 9. 
46 Italian Constitution arts 101–112, 134–7. The power granted to the Court is found in art 134 
by which it is granted jurisdiction over three issues: those concerning the constitutionality of 
state and regional laws (para 2); it is given jurisdiction when there is conflict between state 
authorities, state and region, or region and region (para 3); and has power to hear 
constitutional charges made either against the President of the Republic or government 
ministers, later amended to remove the Court’s jurisdiction over impeachment of Ministers: 
Constitutional Law no1 of 16 January 1989 (Italy) by which Ministers committing crimes in 
the exercise of their official functions are no longer immune to the jurisdiction of the lower 
courts. Article 137 provides for enabling legislation and finality of decision. 
42 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 18 NO 1 
rights of citizens created in the Constitution and as a guarantee against the 
removal or restriction of such rights by government. The Court’s jurisdiction 
may be triggered by the violation of an individual citizen’s right.47 The citizen 
may petition a lower court to assess the reasonableness of the person’s request 
to have the issue raised before the Constitutional Court.48 
Since the establishment of the Constitutional Court in 1956,49 the previous 
interpretation of the constitutional rights provisions as merely programmatic 
and as not directly enforceable by administrative courts exercising judicial 
review has been overturned.50 Even where some provisions have 
programmatic features, their core aspects may still bind the legislature and 
require enforcement. The jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court evinces a 
willingness to assume responsibility for the enforcement and protection of 
social rights under the Constitution.  
Since Italy is a civil law country, court decisions do not have precisely the 
same precedential weight and effect that they have in common law 
jurisdictions.51 Nevertheless, the decisions of the Constitutional Court and the 
Court of Cassation in particular, are taken very seriously in both the political 
and legal arenas, and play a major role in defining the contours and 
boundaries of health care service provision.52 The Constitutional Court, for 
                                                 
47 A Baldassarre, ‘Structure and Organization of the Constitutional Court of Italy’ (1996) 40 St 
Louis University Law Journal 649, 650. 
48 Ibid. See also A Pizzorusso et al, ‘The Constitutional Review of Legislation in Italy’ (1983) 
56 Temple Law Quarterly 503, 504, 531.  
49 For a view that the early Court was conservative and deferential towards the legislature, see 
N Tranfaglia, ‘Elementi Sulla Formazione e Sulle Tendenze della Politica della Corte 
Costituzionale in Italia’ (1972) Politica del Diritto 451 (drawing from interviews with 
appointees). Later presidential and parliamentary appointees were seen as less conservative, 
see G Bognetti, ‘The Political Role of the Italian Constitutional Court’ (1973) 49 Notre Dame 
Lawyer 981. 
50 Law of 11 March 1953 (Italy). See also Pizzorusso et al, above n 48, 504.  
51 See statement by Judge Azzariti, second President of the Constitutional Court, in an official 
speech reproduced in Giurisprudenza Costituzionale (1957) 878, 885. Italian constitutional 
lawyers almost unanimously agree that the interpretations of statutes contained in the 
Constitutional Court’s ‘sentenze di rigetto’ (interpretative decisions rejecting the claim of 
unconstitutionality) have no binding force upon anybody. Cf Mortati, ‘Sull Efficacia delle 
Sentenze della Corte Costituzionale’ in Acc Nazionale Lincei (1973) quaderno 185, 668, 680, 
1299; John Henry Merryman and Vincenzo Vigoriti, ‘When Courts Collide: Constitution and 
Cassation in Italy’ (1966) 15(4) American Journal of Comparative Law 665, 668, 680; 
Vincenzo Vigoriti, ‘Italy: The Constitutional Court’ (1972) 20(3) American Journal of 
Comparative Law 404. The Supreme Court of Cassation and the Constitutional Court are the 
supreme courts of the Italian judicial hierarchy. The powers of the Constitutional Court are 
given to it under article 134 of the Constitution. 
52 A court endowed with the power to pass judgment on the constitutionality of statutes can 
exert a great influence on the political life of a country. Bognetti, above n 49, 981, reviewing 
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example, has specified that certain of its interpretations of the Constitution 
should be followed for the avoidance of doubt.53 In general these courts have 
been very receptive to the claims of insured persons. 
In the Italian Constitution, the right to health is formulated as a radically 
individual rather than as a social right; the right is attached to the individual, 
and not the citizen.54 Although the SSN is funded from general taxation and 
from private contributions, the right to health care is not conditional on 
individual insurance contributions. It is primarily a ‘fundamental right of the 
individual’ and secondarily a part of the community’s ‘collective interest’.55 
The Constitutional Court has effectively interpreted the right to health as a 
right belonging to the human being as such, outside particular considerations 
such as nationality.56 Consistent with this view, article 35(3) of Legislative 
Decree No 286 of 25 July 1998 guarantees to illegal immigrants some medical 
treatments free of charge when it is proved that they lack adequate funds to 
pay for health care. 
The basic principles of the health system are that the Italian state protects 
physical and mental health as a fundamental individual human right and in the 
collective interest, through the SSN. All citizens registered with the SSN are 
entitled to health care. Under circumstances of regional devolution, there is no 
derogation from the constitutional norm, even if the operation of the norm is 
affected. A government body’s failure to implement these rights does not 
detract from their existence. 
The social rights embodied in the Italian Civil Code and the Italian 
Constitution reflect the expanded role of government. To what extent private 
law is subject to a public expansion, or socialisation, is a matter of 
                                                                                                                    
decisions of the court with respect to specifically political rights, wrote: ‘Yet, its records do 
not show a will to participate actively in the political process that even remotely resembles the 
bold attitude and the firm determination of the Warren Court. Nothing like the rejuvenation of 
the legal system brought about by judicial decree in America during the last twenty years has 
taken place in Italy by the impulse of the Constitutional Court.’  
53 See C Mortati, ‘L’interesse Nazionale Come Limite alle Legislazione Regionale Esclusive’ 
in Scritti Crosa (Giuffrè, 1960) 1296, 1297. Decisions of this kind are designated as sentenze 
interpretative di rigetto (interpretative decisions rejecting the claim of unconstitutionality). 
See also F Pizzetti, Il Sistema Costitutzionale delle Autonomie Locali (Giuffrè, 1979); 
T Martines, ‘L’interesse Nazionale Come Limite alle Leggi Regionali’ in Fonti del Diritto e 
Giustizia Costituzionale (Giuffrè, 2000); see further, Merryman and Vigoriti, above n 51, 680. 
54 Cf A den Exter and B Hermans, ‘Constitutional Rights to Health Care: The Consequences of 
Placing Limits on the Right to Health Care in Several Western and Eastern European 
Countries’ (1998) 5 European Journal of Health Law 261, 270. 
55 Italian Constitution art 32. 
56 Italian Constitutional Court, decision no 509/2000; Italian Constitutional Court, decision no 
252/2001. 
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considerable debate. Many commentators argue that the continued emphasis 
on strict legalistic interpretation as opposed to interpretation in the light of 
social and economic context leaves entitlements unaffected.57 It has also been 
argued that individual and social rights are neither conflicting nor competing 
rights; rather, all rights are embodied individually and unified and qualified by 
social contexts. In other words, individual and social rights are unavoidably 
co-existing rights.58  
However, fundamental rights in Italy have arguably been substantially 
expanded and altered by the extension of social welfare programs, such as 
health care, and guaranteed by generous social welfare provisions. 
Fundamentally, the Italian Constitution continues the European project of 
providing for social welfare while guaranteeing liberal rights.59 Social rights 
are interpreted as the rights of the citizen (diritti di prestazione) to demand 
services from the state and its administrative bodies at any level of 
government wherever those services are situated (so irrespective of 
devolution, decentralisation or delegation). While the extent of the obligation 
to provide services is to be interpreted by the legislator on the basis of 
economic conditions, the Constitution sets out an obligation to provide 
minimum levels of health care regardless of circumstances.60 The Italian SSN 
can therefore be considered a national system of health care that discretionally 
allocates a fixed budget, and incorporates constitutionally guaranteed and 
other legal entitlements. 
In a context of scarcity, disputes concerning resource allocation will fall to be 
determined by the courts. The Constitutional Court has assumed the power to 
scrutinise and evaluate the reasonableness of the legislature’s decision 
regarding the implementation of the Constitution’s social rights. It is 
important to note that the Court has not approached its role with an activist 
attitude or a radical philosophy favouring either side of the Italian political 
divide (that is, neither a liberal free market nor a social collectivist approach). 
In no instance has it imposed an original solution to major social and political 
                                                 
57 M Tushnet, ‘Civil Rights and Social Rights: The Future of the Reconstruction Amendments’ 
(1992) 25 Loyola Law Review 1207, 1211.  
58 Ibid 1212. See further W Osiatynski, Human Rights and their Limits (Cambridge University 
Press, 2009) 256 who argues that there is no empirical evidence that social rights undermine 
or conflict with individual rights. 
59 By contrast, American constitutional thinking finds this approach invidious. Glendon, above 
n 39, 537 writes: ‘Perhaps it is time ... to take a fresh look at [the US] constitutional 
framework, and to recall not only that the Bill of Rights is part of a larger constitutional 
structure, but that its own structure includes more than a catalog of negatively formulated 
political and civil liberties.’ 
60 Italian Constitutional Court, decision no 185/1998; Italian Constitutional Court, decision no 
309/1999; Italian Constitutional Court, decision no 509/2000. 
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problems. Indeed, according to article 134(5), it is required to abstain from all 
political activity.61 Instead, it has approached constitutional issues with a view 
that the political system is best placed to manage the social transition 
necessary to ensure economic prosperity and national security, and that the 
Court’s role is not to divert nor accelerate the process.62  
The Court’s initial period (1956–65) was marked by the securing of minimal 
protections for fundamental freedoms, and the adoption of an adequate 
interpretation of formal equality. Since 1965 it has approached the 
interpretation of rights, such as those embodied in the labour and economic 
rights provisions of the Constitution, less cautiously.63 The Court has on 
numerous occasions formulated the right to health as a positive function to be 
performed, and not merely acknowledged, by the state, on the basis that the 
Constitution is worded so as to mandate that public programs be implemented 
and carried out by public bodies.64 Indeed the Court has not found that the 
provision is subject to restrictions by reference to concepts such as necessity 
or reasonableness. 
Moreover, while some commentary on the SSN has suggested that it was 
established primarily to provide health care to those who are financially 
unable to purchase it,65 the Constitutional Court has gone further. It has held 
that the SSN is not merely a provider of health services to those without the 
means to purchase medical care and pharmaceuticals. Rather, it has stated that 
Law No 12 of 1988 (approved as part of the 1992 reforms) imports patient 
choice of provider as a key requirement, with the consequence that the doctor 
is the person who decides when care should be given to the patient. The Court 
                                                 
61 The principle may be difficult to reconcile with the fact that the Court has been given the 
power to pronounce on the constitutionality of laws made by the Legislature. By Law no 87 of 
1953 (Italy) art 28, the Court is forbidden to declare on an ‘evaluation of a political nature and 
any review of the use of the discretionary powers of Parliament’. 
62 Bognetti, above n 49, 994. See W Rodino, ‘The Constitutional Court of Italy’ in Igor I 
Kavass (ed), Supranational and Constitutional Courts in Europe: Functions and Sources — 
Papers Presented at the 30th Anniversary Meeting of the International Association of Law 
Libraries: Bibliotheque Cujas, Paris, August 1989 (W S Hein & Co, 1992) 281, 289 for the 
view that the Court has been accused both of overstepping its authority, and not exercising 
sufficient control over the activities of Parliament. See also W J Nardini, ‘Passive Activism 
and the Limits of Judicial Self Restraint: Lessons for America from the Italian Constitutional 
Court’ (1999) 30 Seton Hall Law Review 1; P Furlong, ‘The Constitutional Court in Italian 
Politics’ (1988) 11(3) West European Politics 7 who states that ‘for the most part its role is 
neither opponent nor legitimiser but substitute, in the sense that it is often called on to make 
up for the technical and political inadequacies of legislative and executive acts’. 
63 Bognetti, above n 49, 994–5. 
64 Italian Court of Civil Cassation, no 1954, 10 March 1990 reported in (1995) Crit Pen 50. See 
also Glendon, above n 39, 525–6. 
65 den Exter and Hermans, above n 54. 
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decision entitles individuals to a universal right to choose a doctor, and also to 
choose where they wish to be treated, despite the system’s pronounced 
political regionalism, and regardless of the patient’s place of residence.66  
In the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, social rights are considered 
within the pragmatic context of available state economic resources, and the 
financial and economic policies of the state.67 However, the Court has held 
that rationing does not compromise the existence of the right, and cost does 
not provide a basis for a decision to refuse necessary and indispensable health 
care to a patient.68 The Court’s decision guarantees that the state will provide 
a baseline level of essential service, and that only beyond this point will it be 
permitted to determine (limit) service provision on the basis of available 
resources. According to the Court, in accordance with article 81 of the 
Constitution, the core of social rights will always be preserved, and their 
implementation protected, no matter how far its extension is suppressed by 
fiscal restraint and economic policy.69 
Health care packaging has important consequences for the equitable treatment 
of citizens under the Constitution. To the extent that unpackaged services 
must be purchased from private providers, the accessibility of these services 
differs according to the wealth of the patient. Private providers have 
gravitated to areas of highest income and ignored low-income regions, 
thereby denying many citizens access to health care on the grounds of both 
income and place of residence. The Constitutional Court has recognised that 
regional inequality threatens the social rights of citizens. Where this ‘unequal 
balance’ is produced by the pursuit of policies of economic efficiency, the 
Court has held that these must nevertheless be implemented in such a way as 
to better provide for the needs of citizens.70  
                                                 
66 Italian Constitutional Court, decision no 173/1987. This stems directly from there being no 
formal contract between payers and patients such that the patients’ consumption of care is not 
limited with any degree of certainty. 
67 Italian Constitutional Court, decision no 243/1993; Italian Constitutional Court, decision 
no 103/1995. 
68 Italian Constitutional Court, decision no 992/1988 (requiring a local health authority to 
reimburse a patient who had used a private provider for a NMR scan since this service was 
not available at the time in public or contracted facilities).  
69 Article 81 of the Italian Constitution provides that ‘[e]very year, Parliament shall pass the 
budget and the financial statements introduced by the Government. Interim budget authority 
may not be granted save by law and for not longer than four months. The budget may not 
introduce new taxes and new expenditures. Any law involving new or increased spending 
shall detail the means to cover them’. 
70 See M Luciani, ‘Sui Diritti Sociali’ in I Cedam (ed), Studi in Onore di M Mazziotti di Celso 
(Padova, 1995). However, the court has established some limits to the state obligation, such as 
the subordination of the right to the availability of public or contracted facilities or to 
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The jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court affirms the centrality of the 
right of the citizen receiving health care, and by extension the primary 
decision-making role of the treating professional as to required treatment. 
Accordingly the returned traveller will receive treatment as needed, without 
regard to whether the provision of unpaid treatment represents the delivery of 
a service that the traveller has already received compensation to purchase. The 
Court has steadfastly refused to allow the primary objective of well-being to 
be determined only by policies formulated to cope with financial uncertainty 
and budgetary restraint, where factors such as health care provision, budgetary 
distribution and resource allocation have to be balanced. While the 
implementation of the SSN funding model focuses on the effectiveness, 
appropriateness and efficiency of treatment,71 the Constitutional Court has not 
sought to intervene in the politically and pragmatically determined 
management of the delivery of health services. Nevertheless it has 
demonstrated a commitment to preserving the relationship of the citizen to the 
State. In particular the Court recognises that the relationship reflects and 
embodies a history of social transformation during which the State has 
increased its provision of welfare to the citizen. As a result, the Court has 
consistently ruled that the health care system must operate so as to ensure its 
accessibility to citizens, the meaningful exercise of choice by the person 
seeking care, and the provision of the requisite (not the politically or 
economically appropriate) level of care. 
B Benefits Pursuant to the Effect of Injuries on 
Employment: Unemployment or Disability Payments 
Under Italian law, the victim of a tort may draw money from the social 
security system providing unemployment benefits, or from the employer 
where the employer, under the terms of the employment contract, continues to 
make payments to an employee after an accident. The relevant questions are 
whether such payments fall to be repaid by the victim to either the social 
                                                                                                                    
organisational requirements of hospitals. Italian Constitutional Court, decision no 175/1982. 
Further, there is no subjective right to unlimited health services: Italian Constitutional Court, 
Ordinance 22–24, January 1992, decision no 19. 
71 The National Health Plan 1998–2001 officially referred to the ‘appropriateness’ of treatment 
for the first time. Appropriateness may be either organisational or clinical. Organisational 
appropriateness aims to deliver health care to patients at the lowest level of the system relative 
to the severity and complexity of the clinical condition, thereby realising clinical 
appropriateness. See George France, Francesco Taroni and Andrea Donatini, ‘The Italian 
Health-Care System’ (2005) 14(S1) Health Economics S187, S197; G France ‘I Livelli 
Essenziali di Assistenza: Un Caso Italiano di Policy Innovation’ in G Fiorentini (ed), I Servizi 
Sanitari in Italia (Il Mulino, 2003) 73. Clinical appropriateness is the focus of the National 
Guidelines Project, launched along with the 1998–2001 National Health Plan, and co-
ordinated by the Istituto Superiore di Sanita, the central technical arm of the SSN. 
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insurer or the employer, and whether the employee’s insured or contractual 
claim for past lost earnings is reduced by the amount of the payments. If there 
is a legal liability of the victim to repay, or the claimant has provided to his or 
her employer an undertaking to repay, then those moneys form part of a 
special damages claim. Voluntary payments from the employer do not fall to 
be deducted.72  
However, amounts paid to the claimant on the basis of either:  
(1) an expectation; or 
(2) a legally binding contract to the effect that the employer is to be 
reimbursed out of damages recovered,  
should be added to the damages claim and subject to a direction that the 
money be paid to the employer.  
1 Constitutional Right of the Injured Person to 
Unemployment or Disability Pension  
The right to unemployment benefits for people without work is a 
constitutional principle. However, it is one requiring legislative enactment. It 
is more sensitive than health care to political contexts, and is under the direct 
control of government whose actions are necessary to give content to the 
formal right. 
The Italian Constitution proclaims that Italy is ‘a democratic Republic 
founded on labour’.73 Work — as expressed in the fundamental principles — 
is not a restricted economic or labour concept and ‘neither an end in itself, nor 
a mere instrument for securing the means of subsistence, but … a necessary 
avenue for the affirmation of one’s personality’.74 Work is central to the 
material and spiritual well-being of society, and it is by its nature more than 
merely economic. The principle of labour is linked to the concept of the 
person, as a guarantee of the inviolability of the person and the dignity of the 
individual. This is reflected in the stated duty of every citizen, a corollary to 
the ‘right to work’: ‘According to capability and choice every citizen has the 
                                                 
72 It is to be noted that the situation is not resolved under Australian or English Law: Hobbelen 
v Nunn [1965] Qd R 105; Volpato v Zachary [1971] SASR 166.  
73 Italian Constitution art 1. For a discussion of art 1 and the meaning of its reference to ‘work’, 
see M Paci, ‘The Constitution and Social and Labour Rights in a Changing Italy’ (2009) 1 La 
Rivista Delle Politiche Sociali [Italian Journal of Social Policy] 111, 114–6. 
74 V Onida, ‘I Principi Fondamentali della Costituzione Italiana’ in G Amato and A Barbera 
(eds), Manuale di Dirittopubblico (II Mulino, 4th ed, 1994) 77, 106–8. 
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duty to undertake an activity or a function that will contribute to the material 
and moral progress of society.’75 
Unemployment protection, guaranteed under article 38 of the Italian 
Constitution,76 is a key concept in a social state founded on ideals of 
solidarity. Whereas the health care guaranteed under article 32 reflects a 
universalist welfarism, article 38 reflects an employment model of welfare, 
stating that workers have the right, in the event of injury, illness, disability, 
and ageing, to be assured of receiving means adequate to their life needs: 
Every citizen unable to work and without the necessary means of 
subsistence is entitled to welfare support.  
Workers have the right to be assured adequate means for their needs and 
necessities in the case of accidents, illness, disability, old age and 
involuntary unemployment. 
Disabled and handicapped persons are entitled to receive education and 
vocational training. 
Responsibilities under this article are entrusted to entities and institutions 
established by or supported by the State. 
Private sector assistance may be freely provided.77 
The Italian Constitution establishes that every citizen who is unfit for work 
and without means of livelihood has the right to maintenance and social 
assistance, and that people with disabilities have the right to vocational 
instruction and training.  
                                                 
75 Italian Constitution art 4. Unless otherwise indicated, translations are those of the author. 
76 The recognition of the right to assistance of those unable to earn a living (now Italian 
Constitution art 38) and the right of citizens to protection of their health (now Italian 
Constitution art 32) was considered by a special Ministerial Commission for the Reform of 
Social Services which produced a report and 88 resolutions in order to translate the previously 
existing mass of unco-ordinated regulations into to modern, simplified and co-ordinated 
system: Ministro del Lavoro e della Previdenza Sociale, Commissione per la Riforma della 
Previdenza Sociale: Elazione sui Lavori della Commissione (4 lnglio 1947–24 febbraio 1948) 
(Rome, 1948). 
77 Ogni cittadino inabile al lavoro e sprovvisto dei mezzi necessari per vivere ha diritto al 
mantenimento e all'assistenza sociale. 
I lavoratori hanno diritto che siano preveduti ed assicurati mezzi adeguati alle loro esigenze di 
vita in caso di infortunio, malattia, invalidità e vecchiaia, disoccupazione involontaria.  
Gli inabili ed i minorati hanno diritto all'educazione e all'avviamento professionale. 
Ai compiti previsti in questo articolo provvedono organi ed istituti predisposti o integrati dallo 
Stato. 
L’assistenza privata è libera.  
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The references to ‘entitlement’ in article 38 evince a clear recognition of a 
prior existing right, but one which is to be legislatively formulated in order for 
its content to become enforceable.78 The ‘right to be assured’ and the 
reference to ‘responsibilities ... entrusted to entities’ arguably require further 
legal or political action for either their definition or activation — although 
there is no express stipulation that the content of the article is to be 
determined by law. Where article 38 states that ‘[r]esponsibilities under this 
article are entrusted to entities and institutions established by or supported by 
the State’ (emphasis added), it appears to contemplate a mechanism of 
regulative control determining the enjoyment of the right.79  
If the right is not directly enforceable, there may be no other constitutional 
means to compel the government to provide for it. In that case, the provisions 
which enable review by the Constitutional Court will be essential to the 
activation of the right.80  
C Structuring and Qualifying Social Security 
Payments 
Indeed in Italy workers on standard permanent contracts are covered by strong 
protection under labour legislation. Were our traveller an older worker in such 
                                                 
78 Cf the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997 art 65(4) (‘Polish 
Constitution’), which simply states ‘[a] minimum level of remuneration for work, or the 
manner of setting its levels shall be specified by statute’ (emphasis added). An extreme 
situation is where it is impossible to formulate a right which correlates with the duty urged 
upon the state. In such circumstances it is not possible for a court to pronounce on whether the 
right has been respected or denied. One example is the Spanish Constitution of 1978 art 40(1): 
‘The public authorities shall promote favourable conditions for social and economic progress 
and for a more equitable distribution of regional and personal income within the framework of 
a policy of economic stability. Special emphasis will be placed on the realisation of a policy 
aimed at full employment.’ 
79 But it may be no more than vaguely aspirational (or political) such as art 110(b) of the Italian 
Constitution, under which the state ‘shall establish special measures for protecting juvenile 
labour and shall guarantee equal pay for comparable work’. 
80 But compare the Polish Constitution art 67(1) which provides that ‘[a] citizen shall have the 
right to social security whenever incapacitated for work by reason of sickness or invalidism as 
well as having attained retirement age. The scope and forms of social security shall be 
specified by statute’. The Italian Constitution is guarded and tends, by virtue of the drafting 
style adopted, to be obviously hesitant; for example, at art 42(1) which provides that ‘[p]rivate 
ownership shall be recognised and guaranteed by laws which shall determine the manner by 
which it may be acquired and enjoyed, and its limits, in order to ensure its social function and 
to make it open to all’.  
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an employment agreement, his or her unemployment entitlements would be 
powerfully protected and virtually guaranteed.81  
The loss or reduction of working capacity due to work accidents, or industrial 
diseases resulting from the performance of a work activity or contracted 
during a working activity, is covered by a social insurance scheme 
administered by the social insurance body ‘INAIL’ — the Istituto Nazionale 
per gli Infortuni sul Lavoro. Law No 222 of 1984 introduced an inability 
pension for private sector employees. The Istituto Nazionale per la 
Previdenza Sociale (‘INPS’) provides for workers who become permanently 
or temporarily, and absolutely or partially, incapacitated because of events not 
covered by the work accident and industrial diseases scheme overseen by 
INAIL.82 The traveller in our hypothetical scenario is subject to the latter or, if 
a public sector employee, to an inability pension for loss caused by 
impairments not suffered at work.  
Workers under the scheme’s provisions may be affected in either of two ways: 
(1) disability (or, invalidity) — a reduction of at least one-third of their 
working capability in relation to their skills and attitudes; or 
(2) inability — the absolute and permanent impossibility of performing 
any work.  
Both categories attract cash benefits and the provision of medical care from 
INPS.83 The available grants depend on the categorisation of the injury. For 
invalidity, the grants available are: 
(1) Assegno Ordinario di Invalidità (the ordinary invalidity grant): 
available for three years, renewable twice on demand, then 
automatically confirmed.  
(2) Assegno Privilegiato di Invalidità (the privileged invalidity grant): for 
workers whose invalidity derived from the performance of working 
                                                 
81 Baglioni, S and Mota, Luis F Oliviera, ‘Alike But Not Alike: Welfare State and 
Unemployment Policies in Sourthern Europe. Italy and Portugal Compared’ (2013) 22 
International Journal of Social Welfare 319. See also Eurofund, Industrial Relations and 
Working Conditions Developments in Europe 2010 (Luxembourg, Publication Office of the 
European Union, 2011). 
82 In 1995, the Dini reforms introduced a public sector inability pension for impairments not 
caused by work and made available to public sector employees who already had access at that 
time to a special inability pension for loss of income caused by impairments caused by work.  
83 See Law no 222 of 12 June 1984 (Italy); Gazz Uff no 165 of 16 June 1984 (Italy). 
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activities not covered by the work accident and professional disease 
scheme. 
For inability the grants are: 
(1) Pensione di Inabilità (an inability pension). 
(2) Assegno Mensile di Assistenza Personale Continuativa (a personal 
continuous assistance grant), which is added to the inability pension 
for totally dependent persons. 
Law No 104 of 199284 provides benefits beyond the narrow scope of 
compensation for incapacity to work. The law refers to: 
(1) persona handicappata (handicapped person), that is, any person in a 
condition of physical, mental, or sensory handicap, which causes him 
or her difficulties in learning, in establishing social relations, in 
integrating into the labour market and that may lead to social 
exclusion or social disadvantage; and 
(2) persona con handicap in situazione di gravità accertata (severely 
handicapped person), that is, a person whose handicap has so reduced 
his or her individual autonomy that permanent, global, and continuous 
assistance is needed. 
Because the aim of the legislation is to cope with the consequences of 
impairment, under the provisions of Law No 104 of 1992, the reasons for the 
impairment (handicap) are not relevant as such. For example, benefits under 
the ‘severely handicapped persons leave’ provision consist of paid leave 
granted both to relatives responsible for handicapped persons and to the 
handicapped worker. 
                                                 
84 Supp Ord Gazz Uff no 39 of 17 February 1992 (Italy). 
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IV ACTIONS FOR RECOVERY 
A Can Unemployment and Disability Payments Be 
Recovered as Collateral Benefits by Subrogation: 
Developing the ‘Same Detriment’ Test 
Article 14 of the law governing INPS85 states that INPS can be subrogated to 
the victim’s rights and can recover all losses caused by the tortfeasor if it 
provides social security payments to the victim. Article 14 provides: 
1. The institutional distributor of the benefits provided by this Act 
shall be subrogated, up to their amount, to the rights of the insured 
or the insured’s survivors against responsible third parties and their 
insurance companies.  
2. For the purposes of the preceding paragraph the capital value of 
the service provided shall be calculated, by the policies and rates, 
on the same basis as those annexed to the Ministerial Decree of 
February 19, 1981, pursuant to Article 13 of the Law of 12 August 
1962 No 1338, to be determined by decree of the Minister of 
Labour and Social Security, after consulting the Board of Directors 
of the National Social Security (4). 
(4). The Ministerial Decree 30 March 1987 approved criteria and 
rates for the action of subrogation referred to in this paragraph.86 
An action in statutory subrogation by INPS, pursuant to article 14, is governed 
by the law of the institution for which the right was created. However, where 
private international law is at issue, the jurisdictional rules are provided by the 
Legge di Riforma del Sistema ltaliano di Diritto Internazionale Privato 
[Italian Statute of Private International Law of 1995].87 This statute presently 
deals with all aspects of international private law such as jurisdiction, conflict 
of laws, and the enforceability of foreign decisions. Therefore, tortious 
                                                 
85 Law no 222 of 12 June 1984 (Italy). 
86 1. L’istituto erogatore delle prestazioni previste dalla presente legge è surrogato, fino alla 
concorrenza del loro ammontare, nei diritti dell'assicurato o dei superstiti verso i terzi 
responsabili e le loro compagnie di assicurazione.  
2. Agli effetti del precedente comma, dovrà essere calcolato il valore capitale della 
prestazione erogata, mediante i criteri e le tariffe, costruite con le stesse basi di quelle allegate 
al decreto ministeriale 19 febbraio 1981, in attuazione dell'articolo 13 della legge 12 agosto 
1962, n 1338, che saranno determinati con decreto del Ministro del lavoro e della previdenza 
sociale, sentito il consiglio di amministrazione dell'Istituto nazionale della previdenza 
sociale (4).  
(4) Con il Decreto Ministeriale 30 marzo 1987 sono stati approvati criteri e tariffe per 
l'azione di surroga di cui al presente comma. 
87 Law no 218 of 31 May 1995 (Italy). See Codice di procedura civile art II no 218/95 (Italy). 
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liability with respect to traffic accidents is governed by article 62 of this 
statute, which provides: 
1. The responsibility for the tort is regulated by the law of the State in 
which the damage occurred. However the claimant can require the 
application of the law of the State where the unlawful act was 
committed.  
2. If the tort involves only citizens of the same nationality, and they 
reside in the state of which they are nationals, the law of that State 
shall apply as the proper law of the tort.88 
Under article 62(1), conflict of law rules provide that tortious liability with 
respect to traffic accidents is governed exclusively by the law of the lex loci 
delicti — the state where the event or the damage occurred. This rule confirms 
the policy of the Italian lawmaker to deny the lex fori the right to control the 
civil consequences of a wrongful act committed abroad. 
Italian law applies only if all parties are citizens of the same nation, in which 
they also reside. In particular, where a party is injured while driving a motor 
vehicle, or while a third-party passenger in a motor vehicle driven by the first 
party, either the driver in the first case, or both driver and passenger in the 
second, must be Italian citizens and resident in Italy for article 62 to confer 
the right to request application of Italian law. Under those circumstances, the 
request must respect the Italian procedural rules and in particular Italy’s 
statutory limitations. Other passengers, not being parties, are not taken into 
account for the purposes of this provision.  
However, if, as in the instant case, one party is a driver of a vehicle leased in 
an Australian jurisdiction under the laws of that jurisdiction, the defendant by 
subrogation to the insured will be the insurer, or nominal defendant, and will 
not therefore conform to the statutory requirement for Italian law to apply. 
Australian law will therefore be the proper law of the tort. 
The issue that arises is the relationship between the law of the institution in 
which the matter is raised to be heard and the lex loci delicti. That is, the 
institution’s right to recover is to be ascertained by its own legal system, but 
the aggregate amount of damages recoverable from the tortfeasor is 
determined according to the lex loci delicti. When the plaintiff institution, 
                                                 
88 1. La responsabilità per fatto illecito e regolata dalla legge dello Stato in cui si è verificato 
l’evento. Tuttavia il dammeggiato puo chiedere l’applicazione delle legge dello stato in cui si 
è verificato il fatto che ha causato il danno. 
2. Qualora il fatto illecito coinvolga soltante cittadini di un medesimo Stato in esso residenti, 
si applica la legge di tale Stato.  
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under its own law, has a right of subrogation only89 and no direct right of 
recovery, it must ensure that it has a claim to which it can be subrogated. 
Article 14 determines that the substantive content of the INPS’s right is 
determined by the rules of the national law defining the source and limits of 
the right of compensation vested in the victim or his or her dependents vis-à-
vis the third party responsible tortfeasor.  
Subrogation, by its very nature, takes place only where the third party 
tortfeasor (here the TAC) and the social insurer (here the INPS) are both 
obliged to make payments covering the identical loss, and is permitted only 
insofar as the damage is the cause of the benefits paid by the Italian institution 
liable to pay them, and the compensation to which the victim (our traveller) or 
his or her legal successors are entitled under the lex loci delicti corresponds to 
the benefits paid by the Italian institution. 
Moreover, since the lex loci delicti fixes the heads, and the measure, of 
damages recoverable, it must follow that the foreign insurer (the INPS) is 
subrogated to the insured person only where, under its national law, it pays a 
benefit covering precisely the same loss as the insured person has an action 
for under the lex loci delicti. That is, it is subrogated to the insured person 
only if, and to the extent that, a sum is recoverable under the lex loci delicti, 
for the same detriment as the detriment in respect of which the social security 
benefit of that subrogation applies.  
1 What Collateral Benefits Are Available under the Lex 
Loci Delicti, or Australian Law? 
The position under Australian law is that it is axiomatic that payments which 
correspond to wages must be taken into account when assessing loss of 
wages. Thus, unemployment benefits,90 family income supplements,91 
supplementary benefit92 payments under job release schemes, and student 
maintenance grants are statutory wages which reduce the loss of contractual 
wages resulting from the tort.93 Tort claims by injured workers against third 
parties are reduced by the amount of compensation received by way of wages, 
                                                 
89 Law no 222 of 12 June 1984 (Italy) art 14. 
90 Nabi v British Leyland (UK) Ltd [1980] 1 WLR 529. 
91 Gaskill v Preston [1981] 3 All ER 427. 
92 Lincoln v Hayman [1982] 1 WLR 488. 
93 Hall v Cramer [2003] ACTSC 112 [67] (Higgins CJ) citing Smoker v London Fire Authority 
[1991] 2 AC 502, 545 (Lord Templeman). 
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unemployment benefits, and disability benefits, coupled by a right of the 
employer (or the employer’s insurer) to be indemnified by the tortfeasor.94  
A redundancy payment must, in certain circumstances, be brought into 
account against damages for tort. In Wilson v National Coal Board,95 an 
injured miner received a redundancy payment for early dismissal but claimed 
damages for loss of earnings on the footing that he would have continued to 
be employed until he retired at the age of 62. Lord Emslie, Lord President, 
said that the claimant had adopted two inconsistent positions — that of one 
who had lost his employment, and one who, but for the accident, would have 
continued working until 62 years of age.96 The claim for damages under the 
head of loss of earnings was not permitted on the basis that the claimant had 
been compensated for the actual loss of employment. 
Fringe benefits such as disability pay, pensions, and medical services, after 
fluctuations in doctrine, are now largely governed by the decision in Hussain 
v New Toplov Paper Mills97 which disallows double recovery. Wages, 
disability and unemployment benefits are covered by the indemnity principle 
on the ground that they diminish or extinguish the loss of earnings or earning 
capacity, and are treated as preventing a loss from arising. Pensions are 
different in kind from earnings lost and need not be brought into account.98 
Pensions do not extinguish the loss since they are payable whether or not the 
plaintiff has lost earnings. They were earned as part of the employment and 
are analogous to insurance.99 Restitutionary claims have been refused on the 
basis that an employer’s payments to injured workers do not save the 
tortfeasor any expense, even when damages are reduced by the amount paid 
by the employer.100  
2 What Collateral Benefits Are Available under Italian 
Law? 
Italian law distinguishes sharply between the sums or services provided to a 
victim by the social security system, and payments received from a private 
                                                 
94 Graham v Baker (1961) 106 CLR 340, 346 (wages), 351 (disability); Westwood v Secretary 
of State [1985] AC 20 (unemployment benefits). 
95 1981 SLT 67. 
96 Ibid 70. 
97 [1988] 1 AC 514. 
98 National Insurance Co of New Zealand Ltd v Espagne (1961) 105 CLR 569, 573 (Dixon CJ), 
588, 598–600 (Windeyer J); Smoker v London Fire Authority [1991] 2 AC 502; Redding v 
Lee (1983) 151 CLR 117, 138, 144 (Mason and Dawson JJ); Richards v Mills (2003) 27 
WAR 200. 
99 Perry v Cleaver [1970] AC 1, 21 (Lord Reid). 
100 Receiver for Metropolitan Police v Croydon Corp [1957] 2 QB 154. 
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insurer. Social security payments are the victim’s as a matter of right, and 
given regardless of the facts of the case. They cannot therefore be calculated 
in the recovery. The Italian courts have decided authoritatively that the 
principle compensatio lucri cum damno does not apply in connection with 
social security payments and services.101  
In a number of decisions, the Constitutional Court has clarified that the 
benefits set out by law, and payable by the state to individuals, are different in 
nature from compensation for damages.102 The cases in point are product 
liability cases where the product was a blood transfusion that caused damage 
to the victim. Of relevance is the distinction between payments which may be 
set off against damages and those which may not, based on the nature of the 
benefit. Obligations arising from the social security system are based on law, 
while the obligations of recovery are based on the tort. Accordingly, 
government authorities concerned with health and social security matters 
cannot claim reimbursement of treatment costs, unemployment benefits, or 
other costs from any damages awarded or settlements paid to the claimant.  
3 The Test: Do Australian and Italian Laws Cover 
Precisely the Same Loss and Provide for Precisely the 
Same Detriment?  
Italian law and Australian law are largely consonant on the subject of double 
recovery. However Italian law perhaps provides for more favourable 
treatment of the victim, and a greater degree of tolerance for some forms of 
double recovery by the victim despite the clearly stated legal principles 
guarding against this eventuality. Both jurisdictions discount payments 
received on the basis of the nature of the benefit. In Australia, pensions, 
insurance payments and pension benefits are distinguished from wages or 
wage-like payments. The latter stands to be set off whereas the former, which 
is a benefit bought by the victim, is not. 
In Italy, as in the European Community generally, compensation by the 
tortfeasor identical to the social security benefit received, grants the institution 
a subrogatory right to repayment; the law sets its face against double 
recovery. INPS is able to subrogate to the victim’s rights if, and only if, it is 
claiming for the identical benefit provided by way of damages compensation 
by the tortfeasor. Moreover, it has been the practice of the courts not to apply 
the double recovery principle in connection with social security payments and 
services. Lastly, restitutionary claims do not necessarily succeed in either 
jurisdiction. 
                                                 
101 See Italian Court of Cassation, no 6228, 1 July 1994 reported in Riv Giur Enel no 467 (1996). 
102 See Italian Constitutional Court, decisions no 307/1990; no 118/1996; no 27/1998.  
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B Is the Insured Injured Person Unjustly Enriched by 
Also Receiving Health Care and Unemployment and 
Disability Payments? 
Restitutionary claims are expressions of the general principle that what is 
retained without a legal basis (sine causa) is recoverable. Significantly, Italian 
law adopts and extends principles of Roman law in that it recognises an action 
for and remedy of recovery for general enrichment based on no more than 
proof that someone has been enriched without justification at the expense of 
another: l'arricchmento senza causa.103 The font of the dictum is Pomponius, 
who in the Digest of Justinian stated that: ‘it is naturally equitable that no one 
be enriched at the expense of another’, ascribing the principle to natural law 
(ius naturae) and requiring that the enrichment be at the expense of another, 
and either unjust or unlawful (iniuria).104  
  
Article 2041(1) of the Italian Civil Code provides: 
A person who has enriched himself without just cause at the expense of 
another shall, to the extent of the enrichment, indemnify the other for his 
correlative financial loss.105 
The reason for the enrichment is immaterial; the only relevant fact is that the 
transfer of wealth is not supported by a valid cause. The enrichment must not 
be justified (that is, it must be unjust) in that a basic requirement for 
                                                 
103 Civil Code (Italy) art 2041; see also s 62 of the Obligationenrecht [Code of Obligations] 
(Switzerland). The French Civil Code (1804) makes no reference to a general enrichment 
action but French jurisprudence has filled the lacuna by recognising the actio de in rem verso 
as a general enrichment action. C Aubry and C Rau (eds), Cours de Droit Civil Français 
d’après la Méthode de Zachariae (Imprimerie et librairie générale de jurisprudence Maison 
Cosse, 4th ed, Marchal et Billard, 1871–75) 725–6, separated a remedy for unjust enrichment 
from the negotiorum gestio. In 1892, the French Supreme Court gave the separation legal 
status when it decided Affaire Boudier Req 15 June 1892, DP 92, 1596. Section 812 of the 
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [Civil Code] (Germany) provides for a general enrichment action; 
the Dutch Burgerlijk Wetboek [Civil Code] of 1838 did not give recognition to such action. 
However from 1992, s 6.4.3.1 inserts an unjust enrichment provision.  
104 Sextus Pomponius, Digest of Justinian, 12.6.14, 50.17.206. See in general R Zimmermann, 
The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (Oxford, 1990) 834. 
See also D Pugsley, ‘Twin Texts and the Compilers’ Working Methods’ (1997) 3 Orbis Iuris 
Romani 40; D Pugsley, Justinian’s Digest and the Compilers (University of Exeter, 1995). 
See also N Jansen, ‘The Concept of Non-Contractual Obligations: Rethinking the Divisions of 
Tort, Unjustified Enrichment, and Contract Law’ (2010) 1 Journal of European Tort Law 16, 
25–6. 
105 Chi, senza una giusta causa, si è arricchito a danno di un'altra persona è tenuto, nei limiti 
dell'arricchimento, a indennizzare quest'ultima della correlativa diminuzione patrimoniale.  
Qualora l'arricchimento abbia per oggetto una cosa determinata, colui che l'ha ricevuta è 
tenuto a restituirla in natura, se sussiste al tempo della domanda. 
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entitlement is absent. The central requirement of the claim is the lack of legal 
cause and not any injustice per se. The object of the claim is what the claimant 
has paid unduly — that is, the payment which finds no justification in a legal 
cause (article 2033 of the Civil Code). 
Under Italian law, a creditor cannot ask more than is due from the debtor and 
must not make a profit. Under the civil law generally, and the Italian Civil 
Code specifically, causes of action in unjust enrichment may arise where the 
debtor pays a sum not owed because:  
(1) of the absence of the debt, or it arose from an invalid transaction; or  
(2) it was paid to someone not entitled (not a true creditor). 
The actions of the parties with respect to their obligations bind them in equity 
such that one credits the other strictly ‘to the extent to which [one is] lucratus 
by [the other’s] materials and labour, but no further; and if [one is] not 
lucratus at all, [one] shall be entitled to repetition [restitution] of the whole 
advance, however great his expenditure and consequent loss may have 
been’.106 In other words, the recognition of equitable obligations arising in the 
unjustified enrichment context demands only that the amount by which the 
party is enriched is able to be recovered. In Italy, unduly paid moneys are 
recovered by the debtor through an action for restitution (ripetizione). The 
structure of the law of unjustified enrichment is contained in the Civil Code at 
articles 2033–40 which deal with cases in which the claimant has made an 
undue payment. 
Where no payment is due, article 2033 provides that:  
Whoever has made the undue payment has the right of action to recover it. 
He further has the right to revenues (art 820 etc) and interest (art 1284) from 
the date of payment if the receiving party has acted in bad faith, or from the 
date of request of repayment (Cod Proc Civ 163) if the receiving party has 
acted in good faith (art 1147).107 
                                                 
106 The formulation is Lord President Inglis’s in Watson v Shankland (1871) 10 M 142, 152. 
See also Davis and Primrose Ltd v The Clyde Shipbuilding and Engineering Co Ltd (1917) 56 
SLR 24. Scots Law, unlike English Law, follows the civil law tradition in numerous 
instances. 
107 Chi ha eseguito un pagamento non dovuto ha diritto di ripetere ciò che ha pagato. Ha inoltre 
diritto ai frutti (820 e seguenti) e agli interessi (1284) dal giorno del pagamento, se chi lo ha 
ricevuto era in mala fede, oppure, se questi era in buona fede (1147), dal giorno della 
domanda (Codice di procedura civile art 163). 
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Therefore, recovery is founded entirely on the lack of an obligation to pay,108 
without the requirement for knowledge that the payment was undue, or that an 
agreement between the parties could not be fulfilled.109 Similarly, because the 
restitutionary obligation requires nothing more than the lack of an original 
obligation to pay, it is not necessary to prove that the payment was made by 
mistake. Making a payment without reason provides a sufficient basis for the 
payment to be recovered. The exception is the indebito soggettivo whereby a 
person who involuntarily pays the debt of another may recover only if they 
made the payment by mistake (article 2036). Italian private law requires that 
payment must be made to the creditor, the creditor’s agent, or to a person 
nominated or authorised by statute or by the court to receive it.110 
An action for restitution of undue payment is an action for nullity (azione di 
nullità) arising from an absence of object. There is no need, given the 
objective nature of the nullity, to enquire into whether the debtor’s error was 
excusable.111  
1 Can the Injured Person be Subject to a Claim in Pacta 
Sunt Servanda? 
Restitution has no place within a valid contract under civil law because the 
purpose of performance of a valid contract is the discharge of the contracting 
parties’ obligations. In the civil law tradition, contracts create obligations 
which performance of the contract discharges. In other words, performance is 
not carried out in order to receive the other contracting party’s performance. 
In an action for undue payment, the purported debtor must prove that there 
was no object for the payment either because (1) the sum paid was not due — 
causa solvendi; or (2) because a different debt was owed from the one money 
was paid in settlement of, so that the debt and the payment lacked a valid 
connection. The purported creditor must prove, in its defence, that the 
                                                 
108 The basis of an action in recovery solely on the absence of a duty to pay also occurs with 
respect to donations: see Civil Code (Italy) art 783. 
109 The Italian and Dutch Civil Codes differ in this respect from the German Civil Code.  
110 This because in Italian law a third party may extinguish the debt of one person owed to 
another: Civil Code (Italy) art 1180. In Germany, the Civil Code itself requires mistake in 
order to support a restitutionary obligation (§ 814); the Roman law approach, which adds that 
it must also be proved that the payor was mistaken, is more common and appears in the 
systems of France, Germany, England, and the United States.  
111 Under the azione di nullità the only available remedy is a declaration that the contract is 
void. The revendicatory action is brought either separately or jointly to compel restitution. See 
E Moscati, ‘Del Pagamento Dell’indebito’ in A Scialoja and G Branca (eds), Commentario al 
Codice Civile (Zanichelli, 1981) 150; G Chiovenda, Principi di Diritto Processuale (Napoli, 
1965); D Balzano, ‘L’azione di Restituzione di un Immobile Alienato’ (1953) 2 Rivista 
Diritto Processuale 233. 
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payment was made on the basis of a valid contractual relationship, since 
receiving the sum without entitlement gives rise to a duty under the Civil 
Code to restore the sum.112  
The restitutionary action is therefore unavailable with respect to valid 
contracts.113 Restitutionary actions may, however, be understood as attempts 
to recover the performance provided under a lawful agreement for a failed 
purpose,114 the failure of the purpose creating the obligation to return what 
was given by way of performance.115 The purpose for which the performance 
is given must be known and accepted, either expressly or because it can be 
inferred from the circumstances of the case. 
In the civil law tradition, the subject of the restitutionary claim is a 
performance. Enrichment does not refer only to sums of money and property, 
which are acquired by transfer. A performance can include the rendering of a 
service, and is anything of value that passes from one party to the other. 
Claims for specific restitution may be founded on an ‘incontrovertible benefit’ 
accruing from the transfer of money, goods or property, or from a thing that 
has been, or can be, transformed readily into money, or the provision of 
necessities such as inevitable (that is, necessary and useful) purchases or 
services.116  
The basis for a claim in and an order for restitution is either that the purpose 
for which a performance was carried out has failed, or a service has been 
rendered in the erroneous belief that it was due. Parties who transfer money or 
performance in respect of failed obligations have discharged obligations 
(causa solvendi) which themselves have failed. The parties are therefore 
entitled to recover in condictio indebiti for the erroneous transfer or the 
erroneous performance carried out under the mistaken belief that it was due. 
                                                 
112 Otherwise the creditor would be prejudiced since payment to an apparent creditor releases 
the debtor: see Civil Code (Italy) art 1189(2). 
113 It is an ‘obediential’ as distinct from a contractual obligation. See D Reid, ‘Thomas Aquinas 
and Viscount Stair: The Influence of Scholastic Moral Theology on Stair’s Account of 
Restitution and Recompense’ (2008) 29(2) The Journal of Legal History 189; N MacCormick 
and J Raz, ‘Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers’ (1972) 46 Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 59. 
114 Connelly v Simpson 1994 SLT 1096; W J Stewart, The Law of Restitution in Scotland 
(W Green, 1992) 78. See also W J Stewart, ‘Restitution: First Thoughts on Swaps in 
Scotland’ (1992) SLT (News) 315; cf J A Dieckmann and R Evans-Jones, ‘The Dark Side of 
Connelly v Simpson’ (1995) Juridical Review 90, 100. 
115 A M Bankton, An Institute of the Laws of Scotland (1751) vol 1; J Erskine, An Institute of 
the Law of Scotland (1773) vol 3. 
116 Inevitable expenses have also been recognised by some common law writers as 
incontrovertible benefits. See further P Gallo, ‘Unjust Enrichment: A Comparative Analysis’ 
(1992) 40(2) The American Journal of Comparative Law 431. 
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2 Does the Claimant’s Action in Unjust Enrichment 
Require Activation under a Legal Obligation? The 
Subsidiary Action of Unjust Enrichment 
Should the SSN claim that our hypothetical traveller has been unjustly 
enriched by receiving goods and services to which he or she was not due, the 
SSN will need to identify an obligation in law through which to reclaim the 
provision of the goods or services. In Italian law, claims for unjust enrichment 
are constrained by the action’s subsidiarity to other causes of action, by the 
court’s strict requirement that all necessary elements be established, and by 
legal principle. The action for unjust enrichment is of an entirely subsidiary 
character in the sense that it can be brought only if no other remedies — 
contractual, tortious, or ‘at law’— are available (article 2042 of the Civil 
Code). ‘Law’ under this provision of the Civil Code may refer to specific 
regional laws, or the national law, permitting recovery.117 A claim in tort will 
need to identify a tortfeasor and a victim; otherwise, the creditor and debtor 
must be bound by contractual obligations. To satisfy the elements of unjust 
enrichment the claimant must, where a lack of damage or any correlation 
between damage and enrichment precludes the possibility of obtaining 
restitution, establish by evidence that another party was enriched by an 
unjustified transfer of property, and that as a result of this the claimant 
suffered damages, for which there is no other specific remedy.118 
Article 2054 is located in the Libro Quarto [Fourth Book] of the Italian Civil 
Code, entitled ‘Delle obligazzioni’ [On the Law of Obligations]. It gives the 
damaged party an entitlement to receive compensation for damages from the 
party which bears the obligation. Like all obligations, that referred to in article 
2054 has, under article 1173 of the Civil Code, a source in law, or in another 
action or instrument qualified to give rise to an obligation. Article 1173 of the 
Civil Code states: 
  
                                                 
117 For example, the Regional Law of Lombardy (Italy) art 16 (now abrogated). 
118 This approach was first accepted by the French Supreme Court, Affaire Boudier Req 15 June 
1982, DP 92, 1596; Civ, 12 May 1914, S 1918, 1, 41; Civ 2 March 1915, DP 1020, I, 102; 
then by the Italian Court of Cassation Turin, 10 December 1987 reported in (1898) 
Giurisprudenza torinese no 39; Italian Court of Cassation Florence, 24 February 1898 
reported in (1898) Foro italiano I, no 321; and finally, in 1942, by the Italian Legislature in 
the Civil Code (Italy) art 2041. See also P Gallo, L’arricchmento Senza Causa 
(Padua, 1990) 1. 
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Obligations arise from contract (Code Civ 1321 etc), tort (Code Civ 2043 
etc), or by any other action or instrument qualified to produce them (Code 
Civ 433 etc, 651, 2028 etc, 2033 etc, 2-41 etc.) in accordance with the legal 
system.119 
The party seeking recovery must identify an obligation in law in order to 
activate article 2054 in its favour. The article suggests two possible 
approaches to interpretation. While on its face the article appears widely 
drawn — apart from tort and contract, ‘any action or instrument’ giving rise to 
an obligation may trigger it — the stricter approach is that, for the purposes of 
the interpretation of this article, the technical meaning of the word 
‘obligation,’ as it operates in Italian law, applies. In that case obligations are 
characterised by privity and are relations purely between obligor and obligee. 
The obligor is a specified person who provides economic performance in 
favour of the obligee. Characteristically, obligations devolve onto particular 
persons (the obligor and obligee). The obligee addressed by the obligation 
may not be immediately ascertainable. This may be because the undertaking 
on behalf of the obligor is directed to a certain class of persons. However, 
even if the undertaking is to a class of persons, as in article 2054 (persons to 
whom damage is caused either personally or to their property), particular 
persons (capable of being ascertained) are nonetheless addressed.  
The rights created in article 2054 are obligatory in nature and create liability 
only as between obligor and obligee. This is supported by reference to 
article 1218 of the Civil Code (the personal liability of the obligor entitling 
the obligee to compensation for non-performance), and article 2740 of the 
Civil Code (the property liability of the obligor entitling the unsatisfied 
obligee to subject the obligor to an action against his present and future 
goods). Given the courts’ interest in strictly construing the basis for recovery 
in enrichment, an action in tort probably only imports obligations as between 
tortfeasor and claimant. While a contract may be the source of an obligation 
for more than just the contracting parties, since it may contemplate, or, in 
effect, advantage third-party beneficiaries and provide collateral benefits, it is 
likely to be understood as restricting obligations to those between parties.  
As stated above,120 the system of universal health care in Italy is the creature 
of Law No 833 of 1978, and therefore of a national law. More significantly, 
by virtue of ASL’s being transformed into public enterprises, they assumed 
juridical personhood and entered into strictly legal relationships with citizens 
                                                 
119 Le obbligazioni derivano da contratto (Cod Civ 1321 e seguenti), da fatto illecito (Cod Civ 
2043 e seguenti), o da ogni altro atto o fatto idoneo a produrle (Cod Civ 433 e seguenti, 651, 
2028 e seguenti, 2033 e seguenti, 2041 e seguenti) in conformità dell’ordinamento giuridico.  
120 See heading ‘Delivering Health Care to Italian Citizens and Residents’ above. 
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who became clients of their services. The relationship between the SSN and 
the returned traveller, therefore, is potentially both legal and contractual, and 
therefore able to give rise to compensable obligations arising from findings of 
unjust enrichment.  
However, article 2054 does not displace other rights and obligations which are 
founded elsewhere in law — for example, in the Constitution and Civil Code, 
which establish the entitlement to health care. The traveller’s claim is 
therefore independent of other rights, and article 2054 does not exhaust the 
traveller’s rights or entitlements.  
C The Principles Determining How Much the Unjustly 
Enriched Party Will Have to Disgorge  
1 The Principle that Recovery Must Correspond with Loss 
Once the enrichment of one party at the expense of another is established, the 
matter of recovery must be addressed. Where the performance giving rise to 
the enrichment is a transfer (that is, of money, or property, goods, or things of 
certain value), one party’s enrichment corresponds to another’s loss, and it 
will be recoverable in full. Then the enriched person returns what he or she 
has obtained (to the extent that he or she is lucratus).  
Barring factors which may justify a greater liability, the civil law tradition 
requires only what is actually taken to be returned. There may of course be 
situations where there is no correlation between what is lost and what is 
gained, such as when one party makes a profit by using another’s property, or 
where a person profits by using another’s rights and interests without actually 
depriving that other person of either. Where the restitution is grounded in 
unjust enrichment, a restitution of the entire profit is required.121 Where a 
service is provided, its value and the benefit it confers may differ. Then, the 
actual benefit represents the extent to which the party is lucratus and this 
benefit stands to be recovered.  
Under article 2047 of the Civil Code, an action in equity obliges the court to 
consider the economic circumstances and conditions of the parties122 
(including whether they are compulsorily or optionally insured either 
privately or under the social security system). These factors may reduce 
                                                 
121 The account of profits achieves this in common law jurisdictions; in Germany only when 
wrongful (schuldhaft) behaviour in making the profit is found will restitution of the entire 
amount be required: see s 812 of the German Civil Code. 
122 Trib Macerata, 20 maggio 1986; Responsabilità Civile e Previdenza, 1987, 107. 
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liability. The Court of Cassation, referring explicitly to article 2054, held that 
non-patrimonial damages (damages for non-economic loss) must be awarded 
where liability is presumed and evidence of liability is lacking, as well as in 
circumstances which import a presumption of liability.123 
V THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPENSATIO LUCRI CUM 
DAMNO 
Italian law recognises that an award of damages must be commensurate with 
loss, since it is compensatory, and prohibits greater recovery. Moreover, 
profits will be deducted from the recovery (compensatio lucri cum damno) 
where, for example, an insured victim further obtains an award of damages 
from a tortfeasor. The law, however, is far from settled, and commentators 
have observed that the operation of the rule of compensatio lucri cum damno 
is not always applied in cases concerning damages for personal injury in 
Italian courts.124  
With respect to insured victims, courts have not consistently applied limiting 
principles. In some cases compensatio lucri cum damno has been cited125 to 
prevent victims drawing from their insurance policy what has been paid by the 
tortfeasor in damages; other cases have held that the principle should not 
apply.126 This divided approach appears to be based on the sharp distinction 
that is drawn in the judgments between private insurance and public social 
security payments and services. The latter do not attract the limiting 
principles. The sums or services offered by the social security system cannot 
be calculated in the recovery because they are obligatory and must be given in 
any case.127  
Where social security provides the insurance to the victim, the obligation 
arising from the health system or social pension system is based on the law, 
while the obligation of recovery is based on tort. Italian social security 
insurance schemes provide services to their members who are injured and 
who are already members or who become members upon experiencing an 
                                                 
123 Italian Court of Cassation, decisions no 7281 and 7283, 12 May 2003, [2003] DR 713; 
Italian Court of Cassation decision no 7282, 17 May 2003, [2003] Giustizia civile I, 1480 et 
seq. The text of the decisions referred to arts 2050–54 of the Italian Civil Code. 
124 M Ferrari, Lo Compensatio Lucri Cum Damno: Come Utile Strumento di Equa Riparazione 
del Danno (Guiffrè, 2008). 
125 Italian Court of Cassation, decision no 9724, 7 October 1997. 
126 Italian Court of Cassation, decision no 115, 10 February 1999. 
127 Italian Court of Cassation, decision no 6228, 1 July 1996 reported in (1996) Riv Giur 
Enel 467. 
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accident. The SSN is governed by Legislative Decree No 229 of 19 June 
1999. Under it, local hospitals are obliged to give assistance to all in need.128 
The Constitutional guarantee of health care also means that it prevails in the 
case of a conflict with other laws, or legal principles.  
VI CONCLUSION 
Understanding the nature and implications of actions in recovery by health 
service providers against insurers subrogated to the insured is an exercise in 
foreign law, comparative law, and private international law. Care must be 
taken to understand the policy and structure of health care delivery to identify 
the proper party (claimant) and to determine the laws by which it is bound. 
This is especially the case where the system of health care delivery is a 
regionally devolved one in a federal system of funding — as it is in Italy — 
such that national and regional laws, and individual agreements, need to be 
identified and weighed. The quantum and extent of benefits provided, the 
motivation of the claimant to recover, and the potential for recovery will 
assume significance in the financial and political realities of the state. 
Moreover, health care and unemployment benefits, as well as others, assume a 
further significance in the Constitution. As a result, an assessment of the 
individual justiciability of those rights in the jurisprudence of the 
Constitutional Court, and the weight of the Court’s holdings in a civil (as 
opposed to common) law system, requires an understanding of how social 
rights as guarantees are assessed against executive policy in the context of 
budgetary constraint. It is further necessary to have a thorough understanding 
of laws relating to recovery in personal injury matters generally, such as the 
principles governing damages payments and the particular form of actions in 
unjust enrichment in civil law systems. Finally, a test for the limitation of 
recovery needs to be developed based on whether recovery in the relevant 
jurisdictions covers the same detriment to the injured traveller. 
                                                 
128 See art 32 of the Italian Constitution; Italian Court of Cassation (Civil), decision no 1954, 10 
March 1990 reported in (1995) Crit Pen no 50.  
